ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil Advance Access originally published online on March 1, 2007
ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil 2007 64(4):846-850; doi:10.1093/icesjms/fsm010
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Viewpoint: the interface between scientific advice and fisheries managementa
NEAFC, 22 Berners Street, London W1T 3DY, UK
tel: +44 20 7631 0016; fax: +44 20 7636 9225; e-mail: kjartan{at}neafc.org
Hoydal, K. 2007. Viewpoint: the interface between scientific advice and fisheries management. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, 64: 846–850.
Basic elements in responsible, robust, and sustainable fishery management frameworks are well understood and easily listed. Common sense and international law underline the prominent role of science in management. Most managers request peer-reviewed advice based on an objective assessment of the impact of fisheries on marine ecosystems, to create a basis for sustainable and profitable fisheries. Management systems in the North Atlantic rely extensively on advice on total allowable catches (TACs) to control fishing mortality in stocks under regulation. This leads to an unhelpful focus on inherently uncertain catch forecasts. With the wisdom of hindsight, TACs have rarely led to the predicted reduction in fishing mortality. And because of the focus on TACs, other elements in the management framework, notably overcapacity and other economic and social constraints, do not receive the necessary attention. A comparison of the way fishing advice is acquired with the same process in the hydrocarbon extraction industry draws attention to the multi-user problem in marine fisheries management.
Keywords: fisheries management, forecast, ICES advice, risk, uncertainty
Received 30 June 2006; accepted 5 December 2006; advance access publication 1 March 2007.
The road to wisdom? Well, it's plain & simple to express,Err and err and err again, but less and less and less.
Kumbel (Danish poet)
| Introduction |
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Even the most liberal economists agree that market forces alone cannot regulate the exploitation of renewable resources. One reason is the general problem of common property usage (Daníelsson, 2002), which requires that some authority prevents overexploitation. Economists distinguish between "strong" sustainability, where the resource cannot be substituted by physical or other capital, and "soft" sustainability, where the resources can be substituted (Miljøstyrelsen, 2001).
Economics require that fishery managers plan, develop, and control fisheries in ways that address the multiple needs and desires of society, and maximize the flow of benefits over time from marine resources. In addition, a management system has to reduce the risk of irreversible or avoidable changes to ecosystems and biodiversity to a level that is acceptable to society. The ultimate objective is to create a basis for profitable fisheries and sustainable services from marine ecosystems.
The central problem is to control the removals at a level where stocks are capable of replenishing the losses. That level depends on the population dynamics of each stock and is set according to the best scientific advice, based on historical fluctuations in productivity (i.e. growth and recruitment). Whether this level is properly assessed depends on the robustness of the assessment and the reference points used. However, the actual removals are influenced by a range of other factors, which not always are taken into account (e.g. size of the fishing fleets, control and enforcement of the regulations, industry investments, and markets for the commodities produced). The regulation of fisheries is also affected by an impressive volume of international hard and soft law, as well as extensive international arrangements for states to cooperate with respect to highly migratory and straddling stocks on the high seas (Meltzer, in press).
Hoydal (1983) discussed whether the role of ICES advice should be normative or exploratory. At that time, ICES turned away from telling managers how to run fisheries (rational exploitation having been the norm) towards telling them what the consequences of their decisions would be (catch options as an exploratory service). This trend appears to have been reversed from 1998 on, when the scientific community (ICES, 1998) unilaterally took upon itself the responsibility to implement the precautionary approach (described in UN, 1995, Appendix 1) by defining conservation limits and setting up reference points. By "certifying" management as being precautionary and fisheries to be "inside safe biological limits", normative advice has been reintroduced.
| Fisheries management: ecology rules! |
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In the North Atlantic, management measures to control fisheries are almost exclusively based on assessments of the state of stocks and their inherent assumptions. Fishing pressure is estimated indirectly, inferring mortality from catch compositions, rather than directly by analysing changes in effort and the efficiency of the fleets. However, this approach has been developed largely because management authorities in most North Atlantic jurisdictions request advice on catch options as the basis for setting annual total allowable catches (TACs) for single stocks. This has shifted the focus of fisheries science away from the management of a human activity and the perennial problems of overcapacity.
Analysing the number of fishing licences per vessel category, developments in catch technology and changes in overall fishing capacity should be straightforward. Moreover, fleet information provides a natural link to economic analyses. The effect of area closures on fishing mortality has attracted considerable interest in recent years after "Beverton and Holt put closed areas on the back burner, and instead focused attention on gear restrictions and fishing intensity as the principle tools of fisheries managers" (Armstrong, 2004).
| How useful is the present advice? |
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The standard ICES advice, partly reflecting requests by client commissions and national administrations, and partly reflecting interpretations of political agreements from within the scientific community, comes on two levels. Working group (WG) reports contain detailed information on data, assumptions, estimates of reference points, models, and calculations underpinning each assessment. In principle, all calculations can be repeated and one may draw one's own conclusions using slightly different assumptions. Admittedly, the reports are not coffee-table reading, and an assessment background is required to digest the information. Additional data on the ecosystem, and to some extent information on the impact of fisheries, is sometimes provided, and occasionally fleet information is given as well. Advisory reports provide a summary of WG reports and interpret the results in responding to requests for advice. In recent years, the advice is area-based and contains information on the ecosystems in which the fisheries operate. Although this has been a great improvement, there is still scope for better integration of fisheries and environmental advice.
The stock advice is presented in a standard format (ICES, 2005, summarized in Appendix 1). Strikingly, most of the assessment uncertainty presented in WG reports has disappeared in the advice. The current assessment is taken as an irrefutable fact and, to some clients at least, inordinate attention is paid to the unilaterally defined reference points. Although work is in progress to ensure methodical consistency in the way these points are derived among stocks, the final set has not yet been established. This indicates that the reference points on which the advice and the certification of management rely so heavily may be far from robust in many cases.
The main problem is the wide confidence interval of the point estimates of current population size, whereas a specific one is selected as the best guess for starting the forecast (Figure 1). To underline the problem, I quote Samuelson (1980) "Statisticians and economists cannot yet make accurate forecasts. Their guesses occasionally turn out to be quite wrong. Nonetheless, people insist that they do their best. Why? Because lack of any forecast usually itself involves an implicit forecast and non-economists have an even worse long-run average score at making a forecast than do trained statistical economists".
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Stock assessments may render valuable insight into exploitation rates that have been sustained in the past, although even after convergence of the assessment models used, estimates will still be biased by unreliable catch statistics (of which there are many examples). However, assessments are notoriously weak in estimating the present state of the stock (Reeves and Pastoors, 2007) and therefore represent a poor basis for predictions. Given the discrepancies in estimated fishing mortality and spawning-stock biomass in the same year from subsequent assessments, a legitimate question is whether these are statistically different and whether a poor estimate for the final year can be used legitimately as input for management decisions.
The problem is clearly illustrated by cod and haddock in the Faroese EEZ (Subdivision Vb; ICES, 2006). These two demersal stocks are exploited by a well-defined fishing fleet and have been assessed annually for many years. Management is largely through effort control (Cruz et al., 2007), and enforcement is in place. Catch data are reliable and assessments may be considered as data-rich. Even in this ideal case, retrospective analyses reveal the bias in forecasting catches corresponding to an appropriate level of fishing mortality.
One of the main problems facing managers seeking to establish profitable fisheries in healthy ecosystems is overcapacity of the fleet, but this issue does not receive the required attention. The annual catch forecasts keep dominating the discussions between industry and decision-makers are the forecasts right?; cannot we have a bit more?
| Economy |
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Fishing is an economic activity, but many management systems pay little heed to economic factors. Economists maintain that society requires an optimal use of resources, i.e. a maximization of the flow of benefits over time (Árnason, 2001). Therefore, sustainable development must be defined in economic, as well as ecological, terms. Socio-economic factors are commonly introduced haphazardly at some stage in the decision-making process, based on claims rather than firm analysis.
Profitability, recovery of resource rent (or other measures such as the ratio of investments to the average value of the stock) would be relevant economic indicators directly addressing the fundamental overcapacity problem. There are strong indications that, if levels of removals and/or levels of fishing effort were linked to long-term economic rather than to biological precautionary reference points, the former would keep stocks well inside the latter (Hoydal, 2004). The same is suggested in a recent report on resource rent in Nordic fisheries (Nielsen et al., 2006). The importance of social and economic values is widely acknowledged in fisheries management, yet it has proven difficult to integrate economic issues into the scientific advice (Pascoe, 2006). Instead, biological advice is twisted and kneaded by management to underpin essentially economic arguments.
Fisheries represent the only human activity in the oceans that is totally dependent on healthy ecosystems and clean oceans, but other activities have an ecological footprint as well: shipping, oil and gas production, wind farms, mariculture, and extraction of building materials. Many of these sectors are licensed to use the oceans while their impact is being regulated. In addition, the oceans are used as receptacles for land- and sea-based pollutants (including diffuse accumulation of persistent organic pollutants), local eutrophication, and globally the oceans are affected by climate change.
How are these economic activities balanced? How can the utilization of the oceans be shared by different sectors? Pascoe (2006) proposes economics as the solution "Economics provide an important framework for the management of the marine environment by potentially providing a common numeraire for the different stakeholder groups. Spatial marine planning is essentially involved in the process of resource allocation between competing users. The benefits to an area in maintaining or enhancing biodiversity need to be compared with the cost of foregone activities in the area. These costs and benefits may be direct or indirect". Such an approach may offer solutions within the fisheries sector also. For example, pricing licences for using different fishing gear relative to their environmental impact might be a strong incentive to develop gear that has minimal impact on the environment.
| Handling of uncertainty and risks |
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It may be instructive to look into how the hydrocarbon industry, another ocean industry depending heavily on scientific advice, approaches the problems of uncertainty and risk in the management of their resources. The exploitation of oil and gas resources is more market-driven than fisheries. Investment in science by the private sector is the main basis for decisions, also for those taken by regulatory authorities. Interestingly, it is commonly accepted that the private companies exploiting these resources pay a resource rent.
As are most industries, the hydrocarbon industry is risk-averse, and the interpretation of available scientific data in this respect is a major concern. Differences of opinion are usually resolved in a peer-review process. Meetings are attended by technical experts from partner companies, some of whom are familiar with the area under review whereas others are not. This stimulates debate and consensus on prospect mapping, reserves estimation, and risk-taking. The philosophy behind, and the format of, these peer-review meetings brings together different perspectives, ideas, and views, so usually clarifying important methodological aspects of technical evaluation and calculation of reserves and risks (Figure 2; Hardman, 2001). In this process, risks are presented up front and can be given appropriate consideration when taking management decisions.
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The description of caveats in forward-looking statements by the hydrocarbon industry might be instructive for users of fisheries forecasts. Appendix 2 provides an example of parts of a statement from an oil company adapted to a fisheries context. The point here is again that risks are presented up front and uncertainty is stressed.
| Conclusions |
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The interface between fisheries management and science seems to have frozen into a set piece, which satisfies neither managers nor scientists. Although biological constraints are a necessary precondition for sustainable fisheries, economic and social constraints are equally important. Although not being disputed as the basis for management, in an undigested form the advice is not particularly useful. Recipients must make their own judgement of uncertainty and risk before taking necessary action. The present form of ICES advice does not make this an easy task. Therefore, I would pose the following questions to scientists:
- is it possible to make predictions with such a degree of certainty that an annual TAC could serve as a robust controller of fishing mortality?
- Can the uncertainty in the advice be made explicit to allow managers to gauge the true risks involved in their decisions?
- Can the advice be developed further by taking into account economic and social constraints, as well as biological?
| Appendix 1 |
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Layout format of standard ICES advice
State of the stock
- Table providing level of risk implied by SSB and F in relation to precautionary limits, level of F in relation to highest yield, and F in relation to agreed management targets, with comments
- Descriptive summary
- Descriptive summary
- Description and ICES judgement whether these are consistent with the precautionary approach
- Table with values of limit reference points (Blim, Flim) and precautionary reference points (Bpa, Fpa)
- Technical basis
- Rationale for defining reference points used
- Yield and spawning-biomass-per-recruit, and F reference points
- Table providing values for Fmax, F0.1, and Fmed
- Technical basis
Single-stock exploitation boundaries
- Boundaries in relation to existing management plans
- Boundaries in relation to high long-term yield, low risk of depletion of production potential and considering ecosystem effects
- Boundaries in relation to precautionary limits
- Boundaries in relation to high long-term yield, low risk of depletion of production potential and considering ecosystem effects
- Outlook for the forecast year
- Table providing estimated SSB at the beginning and end of the forecast year (and % change) and the predicted catch in relation to a wide range of F, specifying these values relative to the management plan and precautionary limits. Forecasts not considered consistent with the precautionary approach are indicated by shading
- Table providing estimated SSB at the beginning and end of the forecast year (and % change) and the predicted catch in relation to a wide range of F, specifying these values relative to the management plan and precautionary limits. Forecasts not considered consistent with the precautionary approach are indicated by shading
- Management plan evaluations
- Ecosystem considerations
- Ecosystem considerations
Factors affecting the fisheries and the stock
- Regulations and their effects
- Data and methods
- Comparison with previous assessment and advice
- Comparison with previous assessment and advice
| Appendix 2 |
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Caveats (adapted from standards in the hydrocarbon extractive industries when companies solicit investments to certain projects of extraction)
In the interest of providing managers, industry, and potential investors with information regarding the future plans and operations with respect to the fisheries discussed, certain statements and graphs throughout this presentation contain "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements and graphs (collectively "statements") with respect to: future economic performance; total production estimates for year XXXX and beyond; the potential stock sizes and catches attributable to certain fisheries and resources; the expected rates of return from certain capital expenditures and projects; anticipated government and regulatory measures; estimated expenditures (including capital expenditures), and benefits expected.
You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking information, because there can be no assurance that the plans, intentions, or expectations upon which it is based will occur. By its nature, forward-looking information involves many assumptions, and known and unknown risks and uncertainties, both general and specific. Although we believe that the expectations represented by such forward-looking statements are reasonable, there can be no assurance that such expectations will prove to be correct. Some of the risks and other factors which could cause results to differ materially from those expressed in this presentation include, but are not limited to:
- volatility of fish prices
- fluctuations in currency and interest rates
- market competition
- volatility in fishing conditions
- uncertainty in the amounts and timing of resource rent payments
- political and economic conditions in the jurisdiction of the fishery
- changes in fishery, environmental, and other regulations
- the ability to obtain fishery licenses and quotas
- imprecision of stock estimates and estimates of fishable stocks.
Statements relating to population size, catch, or fishing mortality in future years are deemed to be forward-looking statements, because they involve the implied assessment, based on certain estimates and assumptions that the resource potential described exist in the quantities predicted or estimated, and can profitably produce in the future.
You are cautioned that the foregoing list of important factors is not exhaustive.
The forward-looking statements contained in this presentation are expressly qualified by this cautionary statement.
| Acknowledgement |
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The contribution is largely based on a presentation at a meeting of the Working Group on the Future of NEAFC in 2002.
| Footnotes |
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a The views expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the position of NEAFC.
| References |
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