Skip Navigation

ICES Journal of Marine Science: Journal du Conseil 2000 57(3):742-751; doi:10.1006/jmsc.2000.0733
© 2000 by ICES/CIEM International Council for the Exploration of the Sea/Conseil International pour l'Exploration de la Mer
This Article
Right arrow FREE Full Text (PDF) Freely available
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Arnason, R.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow Articles by Arnason, R.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Economic instruments for achieving ecosystem objectives in fisheries management

Ragnar Arnason

Department of Economics, University of Iceland IS-101 Reykjavik, Iceland [tel: +354 525 4539; fax: +354 552 6806; e-mail: ragnara{at}hi.is]

An aggregative model of fisheries is developed in the context of the ecosystem. Rules for optimal harvesting are derived and their content is examined. An important result with obvious practical implications is that it may be optimal to pursue unprofitable fisheries in order to enhance the overall economic contribution from the ecosystem. Another interesting result is that modifications of single-species harvesting rules may be required even when there are no biological interactions between the species. The possibility of multiple equilibria and complicated dynamics and their implications for sustainability are briefly discussed. Equations for the valuation of ecosystem services are derived. Only two classes of economic instruments capable of optimal management of ecosystem fisheries have been identified so far, namely (a) corrective taxes and subsidies (Pigovian taxes) and (b) appropriately defined property rights. Of these, Pigovian taxes are informationally demanding perhaps to the point of not being feasible. In contrast, property-rights-based regimes are informationally much more efficient and therefore appear to constitute a more promising overall approach to the management of ecosystem fisheries. The employment of the latter for the management of ecosystem fisheries is discussed and some of the implications are explored.

Keywords: ecosystem fisheries, ecosystem fisheries management, fisheries management, individual transferable quotas, multispecies fisheries, multispecies fisheries management


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 ICES J. Mar. Sci.Home page
L. van Hoof
Co-management: an alternative to enforcement?
ICES J. Mar. Sci., October 4, 2009; (2009) fsp239v1.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.